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Abstract
We dene the empirical conditions on prices and incomes under which transitivity
of preferences has specic testable implications. In particular, we set out necessary
and sucient requirements for budget sets under which consumption choices can
violate SARP (Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences) but not WARP (Weak Ax-
iom of Revealed Preferences). As SARP extends WARP by additionally imposing
transitive preferences, this eectively denes the conditions under which transitivity
is separately testable. Our ndings have considerable practical relevance, as transi-
tivity conditions are known to substantially aggravate the computational burden of
empirical revealed preference analysis. Our characterization takes the form of trian-
gular conditions that must hold for all three-element subsets of normalized prices,
and which are easy to verify in practice. We demonstrate their practical use through
two short empirical applications.
JEL Classication: C14, DO1, D11, D12.
Keywords: revealed preferences, WARP, SARP, transitive preferences, testable im-
plications.
1 Introduction
Since Tversky (1969)'s seminal paper on intransitivity of preferences, the realism of tran-
sitive preferences has become a popular research topic in both psychology and (behav-
ioral) economics (see, e.g., Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (2011) for an overview).
Nonetheless, in standard demand analysis transitivity of preferences is usually an obvious
artefact of the consumer's optimization model. Importantly, however, in practical appli-
cations this assumption of transitive preferences can substantially aggravate the empirical
analysis (see Section 2 for concrete examples). In this note, we dene the empirical con-
ditions on prices and incomes that characterize the empirical bite of transitivity. These
conditions are necessary and sucient for transitivity of preferences to have no specic
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testable implications. In other words, if (and only if) the conditions are met, then dropping
transitivity will lead to exactly the same empirical conclusions. As a direct implication,
we also characterize the demand data sets (i.e. prices and incomes) that allow one to
meaningfully investigate transitivity of preferences.
A notable feature of our conditions is that they can be directly applied to the observed
prices and incomes, without confounding the analysis by functional misspecication. In
particular, we adopt a revealed preference approach that is intrinsically nonparametric, as it
does not require a functional specication of consumers' utilities. This revealed preference
approach was initiated by Samuelson (1938), who introduced the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP) as a basic consistency requirement on consumption behaviour: if a
consumer chooses a rst bundle over a second one in a particular choice situation (charac-
terized by a linear budget constraint), then (s)he cannot choose this second bundle over the
rst one in a dierent choice situation. Samuelson has also shown that WARP character-
izes negativity of compensated demand eects. However, WARP imposes only a necessary
condition for utility maximization, and does not exhaust all behavioral implications of the
neoclassical consumer model.
More specically, Houthakker (1950) has shown that a consumer behaves consistent
with utility maximization if and only if it satises the Strong Axiom of Revealed Pref-
erence (SARP). Essentially, SARP extends WARP by additionally requiring transitivity
of preferences. This makes it interesting to characterize the requirements for budget sets
(i.e. prices and incomes) under which consumer choices can violate SARP but not WARP.
Basically, this denes the empirical conditions under which transitivity of preferences has
specic testable implications.
The question whether, and under what conditions, WARP and SARP are empirically
distinguishable has attracted considerable attention in the literature on revealed preference
theory. A rst classic result is due to Rose (1958), who showed that WARP is equivalent
to SARP when there are only two goods. Shortly afterwards, Gale (1960) proved, by
counterexample, that WARP and SARP may dier in settings with more than two goods.
Since then, various authors have presented further clarications and extensions of Gale's
basic result (see, e.g., Shafer (1977); Peters and Wakker (1994); Heufer (2014)). In a
related vein, Uzawa (1960) showed that, if a demand function satises WARP together with
some regularity condition, then it also satises SARP. However, Bossert (1993) put this
result into perspective by demonstrating that, for continuous demand functions, Uzawa's
regularity condition alone already implies SARP.
Previous studies typically exemplied the distinction between WARP and SARP by
constructing hypothetical datasets (containing prices, incomes and consumption quantities)
that satisfy WARP but violate SARP. Such datasets, however, might never be encountered
in reality. In this sense, it leaves open the question whether the possibility to distinguish
SARP from WARP is merely a theoretical curiosity or also an empirical regularity. In
addition, the datasets that are constructed do not dene general conditions on budget sets
(i.e. prices and incomes, without quantities) under which SARP and WARP are empirically
equivalent (or, conversely, transitivity is separately testable).
In this note, we provide necessary and sucient requirements for budget sets under
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which WARP is equivalent to SARP, i.e. any possible conguration of quantity choices
satises WARP if and only if it satises SARP. The fact that our conditions are dened
in terms of budget sets, without requiring quantity information, is particularly convenient
from a practical point of view. It makes it possible to check on the basis of given prices
and incomes whether it suces to (only) check WARP (instead of SARP) to verify consis-
tency with utility maximization. Conversely, it characterizes the budget conditions under
which transitivity of preferences has separate empirical implications and, thus, for which
transitivity restrictions can potentially add value to the analysis.
A main practical motivation for our theoretical analysis relates to the computational
issues associated with the verication of revealed preference axioms. In particular, whether
or not transitivity concerns are taken into account (i.e. SARP-based versus WARP-based)
bears heavily on the computational burden of empirical revealed preference analysis (see
Echenique, Lee, and Shum (2011); Kitamura and Stoye (2013); Blundell, Browning, Cher-
chye, Crawford, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2015) for some recent examples). In general,
dropping transitivity can considerably alleviate the computational eorts associated with
the analysis. This consideration becomes all the more important given that increasingly
large consumption datasets are becoming available. Attractively, our conditions are easy
to verify in practice, even for such large datasets.
Section 2 provides a more detailed discussion of the practical relevance of our condi-
tions for SARP to be equivalent to WARP. Section 3 rst introduces some notation and
basic denitions, and subsequently presents our main result as a generalization of Rose
(1958)'s original result. Section 4 introduces two interesting extensions of this main result.
Specically, it establishes a connection with Hicksian aggregation, and it denes a dual
formulation (and interpretation) of our conditions. Section 5 shows the practical use of
our theoretical ndings through two short applications. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Practical relevance
Dropping transitivity conditions (i.e. WARP-based instead of SARP-based) can consider-
ably mitigate the computational diculties in empirical revealed preference analysis. In
what follows, we will illustrate this by discussing alternative settings in which compu-
tational concerns are important, and which have received considerable attention in the
applied literature. This will directly motivate the empirical relevance of the theoretical
results that we present in the next sections.
As indicated above, revealed preference axioms (like WARP and SARP) can be di-
rectly applied to the data. They allow us to assess and compare the empirical performance
of alternative models of consumer behaviour in a fully nonparametric manner (see Blow,
Browning, and Crawford (2008); Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2009); Blow, Brown-
ing, and Crawford (2014); Adams, Cherchye, De Rock, and Verriest (2014); Demuynck and
Seel (2014); Adams, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2015) for some recent examples).
In this respect, an important consideration concerns the \power" of the revealed preference
axioms that are subject to evaluation. In words, we can dene power as the probability of
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detecting random behaviour. For observed prices and incomes, it is computed by drawing
a large number of randomly generated quantity choices that exhaust the available budgets
(see Bronars (1987)). The power of a revealed preference axiom is then obtained as one
minus the fraction of such random datasets that satisfy the axiom. As such, computing
power requires the verication of WARP or SARP on a very large number of datasets. In
general, calculating the power of SARP requires substantially more computational eort
than calculating the power of WARP. Clearly, this can be avoided for budget sets under
which SARP is known to be empirically equivalent to WARP.
A closely related setting pertains to the computation of the Houtman-Maks index
(Houtman and Maks, 1985). In cases where the full dataset of consumer choices is found
to be inconsistent with SARP, this index equals the size of the largest subset of data that
does satisfy SARP. The computation of this Houtman-Maks index is known to be compu-
tationally dicult (technically, it is an \NP-hard" problem).1 When WARP is equivalent
to SARP, the computation of the Houtman-Maks index is equivalent to the vertex set
cover problem. Although this is again a complex (i.e. NP-hard) problem, there do exist
very quick algorithms that give the right solution for most instances (see Gross and Kaiser
(1996)).
A next relevant context concerns the so-called \stochastic" axioms of revealed prefer-
ence, which form the population analogues of the more standard revealed preference axioms
such as WARP and SARP (see McFadden (2005) for an overview). In a stochastic revealed
preference setting, the verication of WARP is relatively easy from a computational point
of view (see, e.g., Hoderlein and Stoye (2014) and Cosaert and Demuynck (2014)), while
the verication of SARP is known to be dicult (i.e. NP-hard; see, e.g., Kitamura and
Stoye (2013)). As a direct implication, the knowledge that WARP is empirically equivalent
to SARP can have a huge impact on the computation time.
All the above examples pertain to settings in which revealed preference axioms are
directly applied to the actual choice data (i.e. quantities and prices for observed decision
situations). Recently, there is also an emerging strand of literature that focuses on combin-
ing revealed preference axioms with estimated consumer demand functions, so aiming at a
more powerful empirical analysis. For instance, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003,
2008) showed that combining estimated Engel curves with revealed preference axioms can
obtain tight bounds on cost of living indices and demand responses.2 It turns out that the
algorithms that are needed for this purpose are profoundly more elaborate when consider-
ing SARP instead of WARP (see Blundell, Browning, Cherchye, Crawford, De Rock, and
Vermeulen (2015)).
As a concluding remark, we indicate that our results may also be relevant from a
noncomputational point of view. They can equally be useful for the design of experiments
1Recently, Crawford and Pendakur (2013) proposed a way to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in
empirical revealed preference analysis by using concepts that are formally close to this Houtman-Maks
index. The practical operationalization of these authors' proposal suers from the same computational
complexity problem.
2Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel, and Vermeulen (2015) provide similar results regarding sharing rule iden-
tication in the context of collective models of household consumption. These authors also point out the
computational issues that relate to explicitly integrating transitivity restrictions in practical applications.
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that aim at testing revealed preference axioms in a laboratory setting (in the tradition of
Tversky (1969)). For example, one might be interested in separately testing transitivity of
preferences. This requires budget sets for which SARP is not equivalent to WARP, which
we characterize in our following analysis.
3 When WARP equals SARP
We assume a consumer who composes bundles of m goods for n budget sets. This denes
a dataset f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng with price vectors pt 2 Rm++ and quantity vectors qt 2
Rm+ . To facilitate our further discussion, we summarize the budget conditions in terms
of normalized prices, which implies total expenditures ptqt = 1 for all observations t =
1; : : : ; n. We can now dene the basic revealed preference concept.
Denition 1. The bundle qt at observation t is revealed preferred to the bundle qv at
observation v if ptqt(= 1)  ptqv. We denote this as qtRqv.
In words, qt is revealed preferred to qv if qv was cheaper than qt at the prices observed
at t. Then, we have the following denitions of WARP and SARP.
Denition 2. A dataset f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng violates WARP if R has a cycle of length
2, i.e. qtRqvRqt and qt 6= qv.
Denition 3. A dataset f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng violates SARP if R has a cycle, i.e. qt R
qvR qs : : : R qk R qt for some sequence of observations t; v; s; : : : ; k and not all bundles
qt; : : : ;qk are identical.
It is clear from the denitions that SARP consistency implies WARP consistency. We
are interested in the reverse relationship: under which conditions does WARP imply SARP?
Given our specic research question, we consider settings in which the empirical analyst
does not necessarily observe the quantity choices, but only the normalized prices (i.e.
budget sets). For the given normalized prices, we are interested in the possibility that
there exist corresponding quantity bundles that imply a SARP or WARP violation. To
this end, we use the following denition.
Denition 4. A set of prices fptjt = 1; : : : ; ng is said to be WARP-reducible if, for
any set of quantities fqtjt = 1; : : : ; ng for which f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng violates SARP, we
also have that f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng violates WARP.
To set the stage, we rst repeat Rose (1958)'s classical result, which says that WARP
is always equivalent to SARP if the number of goods equals two (i.e. m = 2). We phrase
this result in terms of the terminology that we introduced above.
Proposition 1. If there are only two goods (i.e. m = 2), then any set of prices fptjt =
1; : : : ; ng is WARP-reducible.
Our main result will provide a generalization of Proposition 1. It makes use of the
concept of a triangular conguration.
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Denition 5. A set of prices fptjt = 1; : : : ; ng is a triangular conguration if, for any
three price vectors pt;pv and pk (with t; v; k 2 f1; : : : ; ng), there exists a number  2 [0; 1]
and a permutation  : ft; v; kg ! ft; v; kg such that the following condition holds:
p(t)  p(v) + (1  )p(k) or p(t)  p(v) + (1  )p(k):
Note that the inequalities in this denition are vector inequalities. As such, Denition
5 states that, for any three vectors, we need that there is a convex combination of two
of the three prices that is either smaller or larger than the third price vector. Checking
whether a set of prices is a triangular conguration merely requires verifying the linear
inequalities in Denition 5 for any possible combination of three prices. Clearly, this is
easy to do in practice, even if the number of observations (i.e. n) gets large.
We can show that the triangular conditions in Denition 5 are necessary and sucient
for WARP and SARP to be equivalent. The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix
A.
Proposition 2. A set of prices fptjt = 1; : : : ; ng is WARP-reducible if and only if it is a
triangular conguration.
This results generalizes Rose's result in Proposition 1. In particular, one can verify that,
if the number of goods is equal to two, then any set of prices is a triangular conguration.
To see this, consider three normalized price vectors fp1;p2;p3g for two goods (i.e. m = 2).
Obviously, if p1  p2 or p2  p1, we have that fp1;p2;p3g is a triangular conguration.
Let us then consider the more interesting case where p1 and p2 are not ordered, which we
illustrate in Figure 1. The price vector p3 can fall into six regions, which are numbered
I to VI. For any of these six possible scenarios, the triangular condition in Denition 5 is
met. To see this, we rst consider the case where p3 lies in region I. In that case, p3 is
obviously larger than a convex combination of p1 and p2. Similarly, if p3 lies in region II,
it is smaller than a convex combination of p1 and p2. Next, if p3 lies in region III, then
p1 is smaller than a convex combination of p2 and p3 and, conversely, p1 is larger than
a convex combination of p2 and p3 if p3 lies in region IV. Finally, if p3 lies in region V,
there is a convex combination of p1 and p3 that dominates p2 and, if p3 lies in region VI,
then p2 is larger than a convex combination of p1 and p3. We conclude that any possible
set of prices fp1;p2;p3g is WARP-reducible.
Example 1 provides some further intuition for the result in Proposition 2. In this
example, we focus on cycles of length 3, and show that the triangular conguration implies
that each SARP violation of length 3 must contain a WARP violation.
Example 1. Consider a set of three prices fp1;p2;p3g that is a triangular conguration.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is a triangular conguration because one
of the following two inequalities holds: p1  p2 + (1  )p3 or p1  p2 + (1  )p3 for
some  2 [0; 1].
Let us rst consider p1  p2 + (1  )p3. Assume that there exists a SARP violation
with a cycle of length 3. With three observations, there are only two possibilities for cycles
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Figure 1: The triangular condition in a two goods setting
price 2
price 1
p1
p2
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
of length 3: q1Rq2Rq3Rq1 or q1Rq3Rq2Rq1. If q1Rq2Rq3Rq1, then it must be that
1 = p2q2  p2q3 and 1 = p3q3:
Together with our triangular inequality this implies that
1  (p2 + (1  )p3)q3  p1q3:
As such, we can conclude that q1Rq3, which gives q1Rq3Rq1, i.e. a violation of WARP.
A similar reasoning holds for the second possibility (i.e. q1Rq3Rq2Rq1), which shows that
in this rst case each violation of SARP implies a WARP violation.
For the second case, p1  p2 + (1   )p3, we must consider the same two possible
SARP violations. The reasoning is now slightly dierent. In particular, let us assume
that there is no violation of WARP. For the SARP violation q1Rq2Rq3Rq1 this requires
1 < p3q2 (i.e. not q3Rq2 ). Since 1 = p2q2, we obtain that, if  < 1,
1 < (p2 + (1  )p3)q2  p1q2:
This clearly contradicts q1Rq2 (i.e. 1  p1q2). If  = 1, we have p1  p2 and thus
1 = p1q1  p2q1:
This again yields a contradiction, as it implies the WARP violation q1Rq2Rq1. A similar
reasoning holds for the second possibility (i.e. q1Rq3Rq2Rq1), which shows that also for
this case any SARP violation implies a WARP violation.
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4 Extensions
Before proceeding to our empirical illustrations, we present two interesting extensions of our
main result in Proposition 2. These two extensions provide some further intuition for our
characterization of WARP-reducibility, by establishing a relation with quantity and price
aggregation. The rst extension shows a close connection between our characterization and
Hicksian aggregation. The second extension derives a dual formulation of the triangular
conditions in Proposition 2, which denes conditions on quantities for WARP-reducibility.
Hicksian aggregation. We can interpret a special instance of the triangular conditions
in Proposition 2 as a generalization of Hicksian quantity aggregation. To formalize the
argument, we rst note that a special case of triangular conguration occurs if, for all
triples of prices, the triangle inequalities in Denition 5 in fact become an equality, i.e.
p(t) = p(v) + (1  )p(k):
This implies that all prices lie in a common 2-dimensional plane, which eectively means
that there exist vectors v;w 2 Rm+ and observation-specic numbers t; t > 0 such that,
for all t 2 f1; : : : ; ng, we have pt = tv + tw.
Interestingly, this actually allows us to rewrite the original setting as a setting with
two Hicksian aggregates. Hicksian aggregation requires that all prices in a subset of goods
change proportionally to some common price vector (i.e. pt = tv for all t, with v 2 Rm+
and scalar t > 0). In our case, we can, for any bundle qt, construct two new \aggre-
gate quantities" zt;1 = vqt and zt;2 = wqt, to dene the quantity bundle zt = [zt;1; zt;2].
Correspondingly, we can construct new \price vectors" rt = [t; t]. Then, for any two
observations t and v, we have qtRqv if and only if
1  ptqv = (tv + tw)qv = tvqv + twqv = rtzv:
In other words, we obtain qtRqv for the dataset f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng if and only if ztRzv
for the dataset f(rt; zt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng. This implies that the dataset f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng
will violate SARP (resp. WARP) if and only if the dataset f(rt; zt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng violates
SARP (resp. WARP). Moreover, the dataset f(rt; zt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng only contains two
goods, so Proposition 1 implies that WARP is equivalent to SARP, and this equivalence
carries over to the dataset f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng. Basically, this denes the possibility to
construct two Hicksian aggregates as a (sucient) condition for WARP to be equivalent
to SARP.
Dual formulation. We can also dene dual analogues of our notions of WARP-reducibility
for sets of quantities (by interchanging the roles of prices and quantities in Denition 4).
Similar to before, a set of quantities will be WARP-reducible if and only if it satises a
set of triangular conditions. In this case, these conditions require, for any three quan-
tity vectors qt;qv and qk, that there must exist a number  2 [0; 1] and a permutation
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 : ft; v; kg ! ft; v; kg, such that the following condition holds:
q(t)  q(v) + (1  )q(k) or q(t)  q(v) + (1  )q(k):
Following a similar logic as above, a special instance of these triangular conditions (with
an equality instead of two inequalities) can be reinterpreted in terms of a dual version of
Hicksian aggregation. In this case, a (sucient) condition for WARP-reducibility is that it
is possible to additively decompose quantities into two (implicit) vectors of quantities that
vary equiproportionately (dened over all possible prices). Like before, this in turn allows
us to represent the original setting as a two-goods setting, which is now dened in terms
of two \aggregate prices".
Intuitively, this dimension reduction is somewhat related to the notion of demand sys-
tem rank. See Lewbel (1991) for a general discussion of this rank concept, and Blundell
and Robin (2000) for an interpretation in terms of grouping goods with latent separability.
In a sense, we here provide a revealed preference version of such a dimension reduction.
More generally, our dual formulation presented above may dene a fruitful starting point
to provide a revealed preference characterization of the rank of a demand system.
5 Empirical applications
To show the practical relevance of our triangular conditions, we present empirical appli-
cations that make use of two dierent types of datasets that have been the subject of
empirical revealed preference analysis in recent studies. They will illustrate alternative
possible uses of our characterization in Proposition 2.
Consumer survey data. Our rst application uses the data from the British Family
Expenditure Survey (FES) that have been analysed by Blundell et al. (2003, 2008, 2015).
As indicated in Section 2, these authors developed methods to combine Engel curves with
revealed preference axioms to obtain tight bounds on cost of living indices and demand
responses. These methods become substantially more elaborate when considering SARP
instead of WARP. This makes it directly relevant to check whether WARP and SARP are
equivalent for the budget sets taken up in the analysis.
More specically, the dataset contains 25 yearly observations (1975 to 1999) for three
product categories (food, other nondurables and services). As in the original studies we
focus on mean income. When checking our triangular conditions for all triples of (normal-
ized) prices, we conclude that 2.39% of these triples violate these conditions. This indicates
that WARP and SARP are not fully equivalent for these data. However, for a fraction as
low as 2.39%, it is also fair to conclude that the subset of prices that may induce dierences
between WARP and SARP is quite small.
As a further exercise, we identied the largest subset of the 25 observation years that
does satisfy the triangular conditions in Proposition 2.3 It turns out that this largest
3This subset can be identied by solving a simple integer programming problem (with binary integer
variables). The program is available upon request.
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triangular-consistent subset contains 17 observed budget sets. Putting it dierently, if
we drop 8 of the 25 original observations, we know that WARP-based and SARP-based
analyses will obtain exactly the same conclusions.
Figure 2: Largest triangular consistent subperiods (FES)
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
In a last step, we redo the previous analysis but now we focus on continuous subperiods
of the full period 1985-1999 that are consistent with our triangular conditions. This can
provide guidance, for example, for breaking up the total set of observations into subsets,
to subsequently conduct a separate WARP-based (or, equivalently, SARP-based) analysis
for every other subset. The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 2. It turns out
that the longest subperiods for which WARP and SARP are equivalent contain ten years
(1982-1991 and 1990-1999). By contrast, the shortest continuous subperiod that satises
our triangular conditions has only four years (1989-1992).
Household scanner data. Our second application uses the data from the Stanford
Basket Dataset, which is a detailed household-level scanner panel dataset. It contains
grocery expenditure data for 494 households from four stores in an urban area of a large
U.S. mid-western city, between June 1991 and June 1993. Echenique, Lee, and Shum
(2011) have used this dataset in a SARP-based revealed preference analysis to compute
their so-called Money Pump Index. To exactly compute this index, they have to consider
all possible SARP violations in a given data set. As explicitly indicated by the authors,
this is a huge computational task and, for this reason, they only approximate their index
by focusing on SARP violations that involve at most four observations.
We have a separate dataset for each of the 494 households, which contain on average 24
observations per household on expenditures over a large number of commodities that cover
13 categories.4 For each household dataset, we check whether the budget sets satisfy our
triangular conditions. Like before, we compute the fraction of price triples that violate the
condition, and we identify the largest subgroups of price observations that are triangular
congurations.
Table 1 summarizes a rst set of results. It reports on the distribution of violations
(expressed as a fraction of all possible price triples) of our triangular conditions for our
sample of 494 households. Interestingly, we nd that none of the 494 household datasets
satises our triangular conditions for all triples of prices (i.e. the minimum is positive),
which means that WARP is nowhere fully equivalent to SARP. Further, we observe that
the fraction of violations may dier considerably across households. It varies between only
1% and no less than 45%. Apparently, for some households there are quite many price
4The 13 categories are bacon, barbecue, butter, cereal, coee, crackers, eggs, ice cream, nuts, analgesics,
pizza, snacks and sugar.
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Table 1: Results for Stanford Basket Dataset (original selection of goods)
violations largest subset
(as fraction of all possible triples) (as fraction of all observations)
mean 0.0947 0.4950
min 0.0103 0.2308
25th percentile 0.0474 0.4348
median 0.0756 0.5000
75th percentile 0.1174 0.5600
max 0.4558 0.7895
observations that can imply a dierence between WARP and SARP, whereas the opposite
holds for other households. When looking at the actual consumption data, we observe
that 11.7% of the household satisfy WARP or SARP. There are no households that violate
SARP but satisfy WARP.
If we look at the size of the largest subsets of observations that satisfy our triangular
conditions, Table 1 shows that, again, there is quite some variation across households. For
example, for one household this largest subset contains no more than 23% of the observa-
tions, whereas for another household it contains as much as 79% of the observations. All
this leads us to conclude that dierences between WARP-based and SARP-based analyses
may vary a lot depending on the household under consideration.
As a nal exercise, we investigate whether and to what extent the stringency of our
triangular conditions depends on the number of goods. For this we gradually reduce the
dimension of the price vector by using a factorization procedure. The idea of this procedure
is to reduce the number of goods, while keeping the revealed preference comparisons as
close as possible to those for the original data. We provide more details of this factorization
procedure in Appendix B.
Our results are given in Table 2, which has a similar interpretation as Table 1. In
general, we nd that the fraction of price triples that violate the triangular conditions
(\viol." in Table 2) increases as the number of goods increases. In fact, if the number of
goods is suciently small, we have that our triangular conditions are met for a substantial
number of household datasets (e.g. the 25th percentile equals zero for k = 3). In these
cases, WARP and SARP are equivalent. In a similar vein, the size of the largest subset
consistent with the triangular conditions (\max. sub." in Table 2) generally decreases with
the number of goods. These results conrm the intuition that the triangular conditions
become more restrictive when the number of goods increases. As an implication, the
empirical implications of WARP and SARP will usually dier more for higher numbers of
goods.
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Table 2: Results of Stanford Basked dataset for various numbers (k) of goods
k = 3 k = 5 k = 10 k = 15
viol. max. sub. viol max. sub. viol. max. sub. viol. max. sub.
mean 0.0115 0.8466 0.0397 0.7174 0.0852 0.6090 0.1046 0.5822
min 0 0.5000 0 0.3077 0 0.2500 0 0.2308
25th percentile 0 0.7308 0.0074 0.5909 0.0198 0.5000 0.0287 0.4583
median 0.0064 0.8462 0.0219 0.7083 0.0534 0.6000 0.0628 0.5769
75th percentile 0.0168 1 0.0519 0.8421 0.1105 0.7083 0.1409 0.6818
max 0.1331 1 0.3221 1 0.5627 1 0.6515 1.0000
6 Conclusion
We have presented triangular conditions for budget sets that are necessary and sucient
for WARP and SARP to be empirically equivalent. This denes the empirical conditions
under which transitivity of preferences has separate testable implications. Conveniently,
our triangular conditions are easy to check in practice. The conditions can be particularly
relevant in settings where a SARP-based analysis requires substantially more computa-
tional eort than a WARP-based analysis. We also conducted two empirical applications
that illustrate alternative possible uses of our conditions.
A Proof of Proposition 2
Before we give the proof of our main result, let us introduce some notation. For a nite
set of prices P = fptjt = 1; : : : ; ng, consider the convex hull of P ,
C(P ) =
(
p 2 Rm++
p =
nX
t=1
tpt; t  0;
nX
t=1
t = 1
)
;
and the convex monotone hull of P ,
CM(P ) =
(
p 2 Rm++
p 
nX
t=1
tpt; t  0;
nX
t=1
t = 1
)
:
The set C(P ) contains all prices that are a convex combination of the prices in P , while
the set CM(P ) contains all prices that are at least as large as a convex combination of
the prices in P . A price vector pt is a called a vertex of CM(P ) if pt =2 CM(P n fptg).
It is easy to verify that every element in CM(P ) is larger than or equal to some convex
combination of the vertices of CM(P ).
Consider a bundle q 2 Rm+ that satises ptq = 1. Then, the set of vectors p
H(q) = fpjpq = 1g;
denes an (m   1) dimensional hyperplane in the space Rm. Of course, we have that
pt 2 H(q). For a non-zero vector q 2 Rm+ , the hyperplane H(q) is said to cut the set C
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if there are two vectors p;p0 2 C such that 1  pq and 1  p0q. If C is non-empty and
monotone (i.e. if p 2 C and p0  p, then p0 2 C), then we can always nd a vector p that
satises the rst inequality. In this case, only the second inequality is relevant.
Finally, for a number j we write bjc for (j mod n). We start by proving two lemmata.
Lemma 1. Consider a set of prices P = fptjt = 1; : : : ; ng and a non-zero consumption
bundle q where ptq = 1. If the hyperplane H(q) cuts CM(P )nfptg, then there is a vertex
pv 2 CM(P ), distinct from pt, such that 1  pvq.
Proof. If H(q) cuts CM(P ) n fptg, then there is a vector p 2 CM(P ), with p 6= pt,
such that 1  pq. From the denition of CM(P ) there must exist numbers j  0, withP
j j = 1 and
1  pq 
 
nX
j=1
jpj
!
q =
nX
j=1
jpjq;
As mentioned above, without loss of generality, we may assume that all pj corresponding
to a strict positive j are vertices.
Let J = argminj pjq where j is restricted to those values with j > 0. If there is a
j 2 J with pj 6= pt, we obtain that 1  pjq what we needed to proof. On the other hand,
if J = ftg, then (from pt 6= p)
1  pq 
nX
j=1
jpjq > ptq:
This gives a contradiction with ptq = 1.
The following lemma is similar to Theorem 1 in Heufer (2014), but it is stated in terms
of prices instead of quantities.
Lemma 2. Let P = fptjt = 1; : : : ; ng be a set of prices and let fqtjt = 1; : : : ; ng be a set
of distinct non-zero bundles such that f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng violates SARP. Also assume
that no strict subset of f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng violates SARP. Without loss of generality,
assume that the SARP violation is given by q1Rq2Rq3 : : : RqnRq1 (i.e. 1  p1q2; 1 
p2q3; : : : ; 1  pnq1). Then,
1. the prices in P are the vertices of the set CM(P );
2. for all  2]0; 1[ and j = 1; : : : ; n the vector pj + (1  )pbj+1c is not in the relative
interior of CM(P ), i.e. there do not exist numbers t  0;
P
t t = 1 such that,
pj + (1  )pbj+1c >
nX
t=1
tpt:
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that pj, with j 2 f1; : : : ; ng, is not a vertex
of CM(P ). Since CM(P ) is monotone and 1  pjqbj+1c, we know that the hyperplane
H(qbj+1c) cuts CM(P ). From Lemma 1 we therefore obtain that there exists some vertex
13
pv of CM(P ), such that 1  pvqbj+1c. As pj is not a vertex, pv 6= pj. If v < j < n,
we have that f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; v; j + 1; : : : ; ng violates SARP. If v < j = n, we have
that f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; vg violates SARP. Finally, if v > j, we obtain that f(pt;qt)jt =
j+1; : : : ; vg violates SARP. In all cases we thus obtain the desired contradiction as a strict
subset of f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng violates SARP.
For the second part, assume, again towards a contradiction, that there exists an  2]0; 1[
such that p0 = pj + (1   )pbj+1c is in the relative interior of CM(P ). That is, there
exist numbers t  0, with
Pn
t=1 t = 1, such that
pj + (1  )pbj+1c >
nX
t=1
tpt:
Observe that t > 0 for at least one t =2 fj; bj + 1cg, since pj and pbj+1c are both vertices
of CM(P). Rewriting this inequality gives
(  j)pj + (1    bj+1c)pbj+1c >
X
t=2fj;bj+1cg
tpt;
where j or bj+1c are potentially equal to zero. Given that the right hand side is strictly
positive, one of the terms (   j) or (1      bj+1c) should be strictly positive. If the
rst term is strictly positive and the second term is non-positive, then
pj >
X
t=2fj;bj+1cg
t
  jpt +
  1 + bj+1c
  j pj+1:
This shows that pj is in CM(P n fpjg), a contradiction with the rst part of the lemma.
Similarly, if the rst term is non-positive and the second term strictly positive, then
pbj+1c >
X
t=2fj;bj+1cg
t
1    bj+1cpt +
j   
1    bj+1cpj:
Now we have that pbj+1c 2 CM(P n fpbj+1cg), again a contradiction with the rst part of
the lemma. Finally, if both terms are strictly positive, then
(  j)pj + (1    bj+1c)pbj+1c
1  j   bj+1c >
nX
t=1;t=2fj;bj+1cg
j
1  j   bj+1cpt:
Denote the left hand side by p000, then the above inequality shows that p000 2 CM(P )nfpjg.
Moreover, as 1  pjqbj+1c and 1 = pbj+1cqbj+1c, we have that 1  p000qbj+1c, as p000
is a weighted average of both pj and pbj+1c. This shows that H(qbj+1c) cuts the set
CM(P ) n fpjg. Similar to before, we can thus use Lemma 1 (i.e. there exist a vertex
pv 2 CM(P ) distinct from pj such that 1  pvqbj+1c) to conclude that there must exists
a strictly smaller subset of prices that implies a violation of SARP, which again gives us
the desired contradiction.
We are now ready to give the proof of Proposition 2.
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Proof. Suciency: Consider a set of prices P = fptjt = 1; : : : ; ng that satisfy the tri-
angular conguration condition. If for all sets of bundles q1; : : : ;qn, f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng
satises SARP, then evidently, WARP is also satised, so there is nothing left to prove.
Therefore consider a set fqtjt = 1; : : : ; ng of distinct bundles such that f(pt;qt)jt =
1; : : : ; ng violates SARP and assume, towards a contradiction, that it satises WARP.
Note that we may consider the case where f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng contains no smaller sub-
set that also violate SARP (since otherwise we could replace P by a smaller subset of
prices). Next, let us renumber the observations such that the SARP violation is given by
q1Rq2Rq3 : : : RqnRq1 (i.e. 1  p1q2; 1  p2q3; : : : ; 1  pnq1).
Consider all three element subsets fpj;pbj+1c;pbj+2cg. Given that P is a triangular
conguration, we have that, for all j, there is a  2 [0; 1] such that one of the following
inequalities holds:
pj  pbj+1c + (1  )pbj+2c; (1)
pbj+1c  pj + (1  )pbj+2c; (2)
pbj+2c  pj + (1  )pbj+1c; (3)
pj  pbj+1c + (1  )pbj+2c; (4)
pbj+1c  pj + (1  )pbj+2c; (5)
pbj+2c  pj + (1  )pbj+1c: (6)
If one of the latter inequalities (4)-(6) holds, then either pj;pbj+1c or pbj+2c is not a vertex
of CM(P ), which contradicts Lemma 2. Given this, it must be that one of the inequalities
(1)-(3) holds. Let us rst show that (1) and (3) cannot hold.
Assume that (1) holds. Since f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng contains no subset that violates
SARP, we know from Lemma 2 that the inequality cannot be strict. As such, it must be
that the inequality holds with equality, i.e.
pj = pbj+1c + (1  )pbj+2c:
This implies that
pjqbj+2c = pbj+1cqbj+2c + (1  )pbj+2cqbj+2c
 pbj+1cqbj+1c + (1  )
 1:
As such we obtain that the smaller data set f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : n; t 6= bj + 1cg violates
SARP, a contradiction.
Next assume that (3) holds. Again by Lemma 2, we have that the inequality cannot
be strict and thus that
pbj+2c = pj + (1  )pbj+1c:
Observe that 1 < pbj+2cqbj+1c, since otherwise fpbj+1c;qbj+1c;pbj+2c;qbj+2cg violates WARP.
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This implies
1 < pbj+2cqbj+1c
= pjqbj+1c + (1  )pbj+1cqbj+1c
= pjqbj+1c + (1  );
which is equivalent to 1 < pjqbj+1c. This contradicts 1  pjqbj+1c.
We can thus conclude that for all j, (2) must hold. If for some j this inequality holds
with an equality, then
1  pbj+1cqbj+2c
= pjqbj+2c + (1  )pbj+2cqbj+2c
= pjqbj+2c + (1  );
which implies that 1  pjqbj+2c. But then f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; n; t 6= bj + 1cg violates
SARP, which gives a contradiction.
Given all this, it must be the case that there exist numbers j 2 [0; 1] such that,
1p1 + (1  1)p3 > p2;
2p2 + (1  2)p4 > p3;
: : : ;
n 1pn 1 + (1  n 1)p1 > pn;
npn + (1  n)p2 > p1:
Let us rst show that for all j, j =2 f0; 1g. If j = 1, we obtain that pj > pbj+1c. Then
1 = pjqj  pbj+1cqj so we have that fpj;qj;pbj+1c;qbj+1cg violates WARP. If j = 0, we
obtain that pbj+2c > pbj+1c. Then we have that 1  pbj+2cqbj+3c  pbj+1cqbj+3c. This
implies that the smaller data set f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; n; t 6= bj + 2cg violates SARP.
Now, let us show by induction on n that above system of inequalities with j 2]0; 1[
can not have a solution for the j.
If n = 3, we obtain the system,
1p1 + (1  1)p3 > p2;
2p2 + (1  2)p1 > p3;
3p3 + (1  3)p2 > p1:
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This gives
p2 < 1p1 + (1  1)p3;
p2 >  (1  2)
2
p1 +
1
2
p3;
p2 >   3
1  3p3 +
1
1  3p1:
Combining these inequalities leads to
0 <

1 +
(1  2)
2

p1 +

(1  1)  1
2

p3;
0 <

1   1
1  3

p1 +

(1  1) + 3
1  3

p3;
which gives the contradiction,
p1 > p3 and p1 < p3:
For the induction step, assume that there is no solution for any set of n prices and
consider a system of inequalities with n + 1 prices. The inequalities involving pn+1 are
given by
n 1pn 1 + (1  n 1)pn+1 > pn;
npn + (1  n)p1 > pn+1;
n+1pn+1 + (1  n+1)p2 > p1:
This is equivalent to
pn+1 >
1
1  n 1pn  
n 1
1  n 1pn 1;
pn+1 < npn + (1  n)p1;
pn+1 >  1  n+1
n+1
p2 +
1
n+1
p1
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Combining these inequalities leads to
npn + (1  n)p1 > 1
1  n 1pn  
n 1
1  n 1pn 1;
npn + (1  n)p1 >  1  n+1
n+1
p2 +
1
n+1
p1
() n 1
1  n 1pn 1 + (1  n)p1 >

1
1  n 1   n

pn;
npn +
1  n+1
n+1
p2 >

1
n+1
  (1  n)

p1
() n 1pn 1 + (1  n)(1  n 1)p1 > (1  n(1  n 1))pn;
nn+1pn + (1  n+1)p2 > (1  (1  n)n+1)p1
() n 1
1  n(1  n 1)pn 1 +
(1  n)(1  n 1)
1  n(1  n 1) p1 > pn;
nn+1
1  (1  n)n+1pn +
(1  n+1)
1  (1  n)n+1p2 > p1:
Let us denote 0n 1 =
n 1
1 n(1 n 1) and 
0
n =
nn+1
1 (1 n)n+1 . It is easily veried that
0n 1; 
0
n 2]0; 1[. Substitution then gives
0n 1pn 1 + (1  0n 1)p1 > pn and 0npn + (1  0n)p2 > p1:
Thus, we eectively substituted the last three inequalities of the system with n+1 prices by
the last two inequalities for the system with only n prices. From the induction hypothesis,
we know that this system has no feasible solution. This infeasibility nishes the suciency
part of our proof, since we can conclude that the triangular conguration implies WARP-
reducibility.
Necessity: To show the reverse, let us consider a set of prices P that is not a triangular
conguration. In particular, let p1;p2;p3 be three distinct price vectors such that none of
the vector inequalities is satised. First of all, as the triangular conguration is not satis-
ed, it must be that the three prices form the vertices of the convex set CM(fp1;p2;p3g).
Consider the convex sets CM(fp1;p2g) and C(fp1;p3g). Then,
CM(fp1;p2g) \ (C(fp1;p3g) n fp1;p3g) = ;:
In order to see this, assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists a vector p such that
p  p1 + (1  )p2 and p = p1 + (1  )p3 (with  2]0; 1[). Then, substitution gives
(  )p1 + (1  )p3  (1  )p2:
This implies that  6= 1, since otherwise p3  p1 which contradicts with p1;p2;p3 not
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being a triangular conguration. If   , then
(  )
1   p1 +
(1  )
1   p3  p2:
This shows that a convex combination of p1 and p3 is larger than p2, which again implies
that the prices form a triangular conguration. On the other hand, if  > , then
p3    
1  p1 +
1  
1  p2:
This shows that p3 is larger than the convex combination of p1 and p2, again showing that
the prices form a triangular conguration. This proves our conjecture.
Therefore, from the supporting hyperplane theorem, we know that there exists a hy-
perplane H(q1) with p1q1 = 1, 1 < p2q1 and 1  p3q1. We can of course repeat this
reasoning, by exchanging the indices, in order to show that there also exist a q2 and a q3
satisfying similar constraints. All this implies that there exist q1;q2 and q3 such that
p1q1 = 1;p2q2 = 1;p3q3 = 1;
1  p1q2; 1  p2q3; 1  p3q1;
1 < p1q3; 1 < p2q1; 1 < p3q2:
This implies a cycle of length 3 that violates SARP, while there is no WARP violation.
B Factorization procedure
Start from a dataset with n observations and m goods. Consider a number k < m and
denote by P the n m matrix where all row vectors pt are stacked above each other. A
non-negative matrix factorization of P consists of a non-negative matrix W of dimension
n k and a non-negative matrix M of dimension k m such that
P
(nm)
 W
(nk)
M
(km)
:
Usually, the approximation is close in the sense that it minimizes the sum of squaresPn
t=1
Pm
l=1

pt;l  
Pk
i=1Wt;iMi;l
2
. Let wt be the t-th row vector of W . Then, if the
factorization is close to exact, we can write pt  wtM . We also have that, for any vectors
qt and qv, qtRqv if and only if
ptqt  ptqv 1  wtMqv () 1  wtzv;
where zv = Mqv. The vector wt can be interpreted as a k-dimensional price vector and
the vector zv as a k-dimensional quantity vector. As such, if the factorization is exact,
we obtain that qtRqv for the dataset f(pt;qt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng if and only if ztRzv for the
dataset f(wt; zt)jt = 1; : : : ; ng. By factorizing the matrix P , we therefore reduced the
number of goods from m to k. In our application, we use the factorization algorithm of
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Kim and Park (2008). We consider k = 3; 5; 10 and 15. For these alternative k-values, we
verify the triangular conditions on the normalized prices wt=(wtzt). We remark that, if
the factorization is exact, then pt = wtM and thus wtzt = 1, so that this normalization
becomes redundant.
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